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CONTENTSAbstract
We extend the scarce evidence on labor supply in post-transition
countries by estimating the wage elasticity of labor force participation
in the Czech Republic. Using the household income survey data of
2002, we nd that a one-percent rise in the gross wage increases the
probability of working by 0.16 and 0.02 percentage points for women
and men, respectively. Taking into account the tax and benet sys-
tem, these semi-elasticities fall to 0.06 for women and 0.01 for men. We
interpret the dierence between the estimates from the two specica-
tions as a summary measure of the welfare system disincentives. The
estimated wage elasticities lie at the lower end of the range of values
reported for mature market economies. This nding is consistent with
the stylized fact that the labor supply in countries with high labor
force participation rates, such as in the Czech Republic, tends to be
less sensitive to wages.
Keywords: Labor supply, transition, welfare system
JEL classication: J22, J31, P30
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Evidence on the labor supply behavior in transition and post-transition
countries is scarce. In many planned economies labor force participation was
obligatory and jobs were created by the government to ensure everybody was
working. Although there was a gradual withdrawal from labor market during
the transition from planned to market economy, labor force participation
rates in many European post-Communist countries remain still high, in
particular among women, when compared to the mature market economies.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we extend the limited knowledge
of labor supply behavior in post-transition countries and provide one of the
rst estimates of the wage elasticity of labor force participation with Czech
data. Second, we compare two alternative specications: In the rst one,
we use the gross monthly earnings as the wage variable in the labor force
participation model, while in the second, we substitute it with the eective
net monthly wage that takes into account taxes and benets. We interpret
the dierence between the two specications as a behavior-based measure
of the welfare system disincentives, which we consider to be better than the
traditional ex ante make-work-pay indicators.
Using the Czech household income survey data of 2002, we nd that a
one-percent rise in the gross wage increases the probability of working by
0.16 and 0.02 percentage points for women and men, respectively. Replacing
gross wage with the eective net wage, these semi-elasticities fall to 0.06 for
women and 0.01 for men. Under both specications, wage responsiveness of
the labor force participation is higher among women and among individuals
who earn lower wages. The work disincentives of the welfare system are
stronger for women than for men.
Our estimates of wage semi-elasticities of labor force participation are
at the lower end of the range of values documented for mature market
economies. The small size of the estimates is consistent with the recent
empirical evidence that the labor supply in countries with high labor force
participation rates, such as in the Czech Republic, tends to be less sensitive
to wages.
The estimated eects of other determinants of labor force participation,
such as marital status or presence of children, are also in line with the
results documented in the standard literature, which suggests that labor
supply behavior in the post-transition Czech Republic is comparable to the
one in the mature market economies.
Our ndings show that for most prime-age individuals in the post-tran-
sition Czech Republic, labor supply does not respond much to small changes
in wages. Lowering income taxes under the current social benet structure,
is therefore unlikely to substantially enhance employment.
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Labor markets in post-Communist countries resemble those in mature mar-
ket economies. Returns to human capital, gender discrimination, unemploy-
ment duration, matching functions or wage curves have been estimated for
markets in transition1 and have been found to be comparable to the ones
documented for standard market economies. However, evidence on labor
supply behavior during and after transition is scarce2 and a comparison
with standard ndings from market economies is lacking.
This paper investigates labor supply behavior in the Czech Republic
thirteen years after the change of the political regime. Using the household
income survey data of 2002, we estimate the wage elasticity of labor force
participation using two dierent denitions of wage: gross wage, ignoring the
tax and benet system, and the eective net wage, which takes into account
the taxes paid and benets received. A comparison of the two specications
illustrates the impact of taxes and benets on a labor supply decision. We
interpret the dierence between the two estimates of the wage elasticity of
labor force participation as an indicator of welfare system disincentives. We
consider this behavior-based measure, which reects the actual distortionary
eect of government policies on labor supply, to be a more accurate tool for
policy evaluation than the (ex ante) make-work-pay indicators, reported by
international organizations.3
We nd that a one-percent rise in the gross wage increases the prob-
ability of working by 0.16 and 0.02 percentage point for women and men,
respectively. When we substitute the gross wage with the eective net wage,
these semi-elasticities4 fall to 0.06 for women and 0.01 for men. Under both
specications and for both genders, wage sensitivity of the labor force par-
ticipation decreases with earnings. Gross wage elasticity in the top wage
1See for example Orazem and Vodopivec (1997), M unich, Svejnar, and Terrell (2005b),
and M unich, Svejnar, and Terrell (2005a) on returns to human capital; Hunt (2002),
Jollie (2002), Adamchik and Bedi (2003), Jurajda (2003), Jurajda (2005), and Jurajda
and Harmgart (2007) on gender discrimination; Ham, Svejnar, and Terrell (1998) and
Ham, Svejnar, and Terrell (1999) on unemployment duration; M unich and Svejnar (2007)
on unemployment ows and the Beveridge curve; Galu s c ak and M unich (2005) on the
wage curve; and Galu s c ak and M unich (2007) on the matching function.
2We found only two papers that estimate wage elasticity of the labor supply in tran-
sition countries, Chase (1995) in the Czech and Slovak Republics and Saget (1999) in
Hungary. They focus on the early stage of transition and nd rather unexpected values
(compared to the estimates for mature market economies in the 1990s). While Saget
(1999) documents rather high (1.81) wage elasticity of labor force participation of Hun-
garian married women, Chase (1995) estimates extremely low (zero) elasticity of labor
force participation of Czech married women. Blau and Kahn (2007) report that the corre-
sponding values for the US in 1990 lie between 0.41 and 0.44. We discuss the two papers
in more detail in the next section.
3The average and marginal eective tax rates, net replacement ratios, and welfare
traps are the most popular among the make-work-pay indicators. See for example OECD
(2004).
4While wage elasticity is dened as the percentage change in the probability of sup-
plying work in response to a one-percent rise in wage, wage semi-elasticity describes the
absolute change (in percentage points) of the probability of supplying work in response to
a one-percent rise in wages.
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the elasticity in the bottom wage quintile; the corresponding dierences for
the net eective wage are similar: 83 percent for men and 41 percent for
women.
Our estimates of wage semi-elasticities of labor force participation are
at the lower end of the range of values documented for mature market
economies. The small size of the estimates is consistent with the recent
empirical evidence (see Blau and Kahn, 2007 and Alesina and Ichino, 2007)
that labor supply in countries with high labor force participation rates, such
as the 81.6 percent for women and 94.8 percent for men in the Czech Re-
public in 2005, tends to be less sensitive to wages. We therefore expect
a limited response of labor supply to wages also in other post-transition
countries which have retained high labor force participation rates since the
Communist period.5
The estimated eects of other determinants of labor force participation,
such as marital status or presence of children, are also in line with the
results documented in the standard literature, which suggests that labor
supply behavior in the post-transition Czech Republic is comparable to the
one in mature market economies. While other income (dened as the sum
of the non-labor income of the individual and other household income, after
tax and excluding social benets); other economic activity in the household
(dened as the presence of economically active members other than the
analyzed individual and her spouse); and a disability reduce the labor force
participation of both genders, being married and having young children has
an adverse eect only on women's decision to work.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the
stylized facts about labor supply in mature market and transition economies.
We then present theoretical framework for the labor supply decision, our
econometric model of labor force participation, and a brief description of
our data. Our main results, their interpretation and policy implications are
summarized next, followed by conclusion. Denitions of key variables and
further details of our estimation are presented in the Appendix.
2 Labor Supply in Mature Market and Transition
Economies
The vast empirical research on labor supply in mature market economies6
has produced many estimates of wage elasticity that span relatively broad
5In many Communist countries, labor force participation was obligatory and encour-
aged both ideologically and by institutions such as free provision of child care. Although
gradual withdrawal from labor market occurred during the transition from planned to
market economies, the labor force participation rates in many European post-Communist
countries, remain still high, when compared to mature market economies, such as France,
Germany and the US; for comparison of the labor force participation rates see Table 7 in
section 7, where we interpret our results.
6Killingsworth (1983) and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) provide comprehensive sur-
veys of models, methods and ndings.
7
ECB
Working Paper Series No 887
March 2008intervals. The values typically range from 0 to 0.12 for men and from 0.05
to 2 for women (see for example tables 1 and 2 in Blundell and MaCurdy,
1999). Female labor supply|especially of married women and women with
children|is almost always found to be more wage sensitive than that of
men. While most of these estimates are based on a full labor supply model
of supply of hours of work, some studies, such as ours, focus only on labor
force participation, a binary decision whether to work. Most papers estimate
wage elasticity with gross wages, but there is also extensive literature which
takes tax and benet systems into account.7;8
Among the estimates for mature market economies, the most compara-
ble, in terms of the method, time period, and focus, with our gross wage
specication are in Blau and Kahn (2007). They nd that the wage semi-
elasticity of labor force participation of married women in the US fell from
roughly 0.43 to 0.29 between 1990 and 2000.9
In contrast with the substantial labor supply literature in mature market
economies, research on labor supply behavior in countries after the transition
from planned to market economies is scarce. To our knowledge, there are
only two papers which directly estimate the wage elasticity of labor supply
in transition countries: Saget (1999) (for Hungary) and Chase (1995) (for
Czech and Slovak Republic).10 Similar to this work, the two studies focus
on labor force participation rather than the supply of hours worked. Their
estimates come from the early phases of transition and their scope is limited
to labor supply behavior of married women. Both papers specify labor force
participation as a function of gross wage, ignoring income taxes and social
benets.
Saget (1999) estimates a labor force participation model with a relatively
small sample of 720 prime aged (24 to 54 years old), married women using
data from 1992. Women on maternity leave and unemployed women are ex-
cluded from the sample, which prevents direct comparison with the existing
literature that typically leaves these two groups in the sample. Based on
her estimation, Saget nds the wage elasticity of labor force participation
of Hungarian married women in 1992 to be 1.81,11 a value which is much
7See for example the Special Issue on Taxation and Labor Supply in Industrial Coun-
tries of the Journal of Human Resources, 25(3), Summer 1990. A comprehensive overview
of the literature that estimates the eect of taxes and benets on labor supply can be also
found in Hausman (1985) and Mott (2002).
8Recent literature estimates wage sensitivity of labor supply using natural experiments
such as changes in labor market policies. Although these methods are almost certainly
superior to the simple estimation based on cross-sectional variation, neither panel data
nor natural experiments isolated from the rest of the changes are available in the Czech
Republic or other transition countries.
9The wage semi-elasticities reported in Blau and Kahn (2007), table 6 range across the
four alternative specications they estimate between 0.41 and 0.44 in 1990 and between
0.27 and 0.30 in 2000.
10Bonin and Euwals (2005) also explore the labor force participation of married women
in East and West Germany during the 1990s, after the German reunication, and use
earnings as one of its determinants. However, they do not focus on wage elasticity and
only mention the signicant and positive relationship they nd between participation and
wages (without presenting the marginal eects or calculating the elasticities).
11The value of 1.81 seems also hard to reconcile with another representation of Saget's
8
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Source: Aggregate unemployment rate of total population aged 15 years and above. Czech
Statistical Oce, seasonally adjusted, ILO denition.
higher than for example roughly 0.75 implied by the estimates of Blau and
Kahn (2007) for the US in 1990.12
Chase (1995) compares labor force participation of Czech and Slovak
married women (between 20 and 69 years of age) before (in 1984) and after
(in 1993) the change of the political regime and the division of Czechoslo-
vakia. In the specication that uses only the predicted own and husband's
earnings in the labor force participation equation, which is the most compa-
rable to our analysis here, Chase nds that the wage semi-elasticity of labor
force participation changed from 0.54 to zero13 for the Czech and from 0.49
to 0.63 for the Slovak married women between the two years.14
In 1993, four years after the change of the political regime, both the
Czech and Slovak Republics were still undergoing reforms and structural
changes as a part of the transition process from planned to market economies.
At that time, the phenomenon of unemployment had not yet emerged in the
ndings that \a one forint increase in the predicted wage [of a representative woman who
earns 80 Ft per hour, i.e., a 1.25 percent increase in wage] ...is estimated to increase the
probability of her working by 3.6 per cent," p. 589 (which at the average participation
rate of 75 percent corresponds to the elasticity of 3.8). The marginal eect corresponding
to the 1.81 elasticity and 75 percent participation rate on the other hand is 1.36.
12Blau and Kahn (2007) estimate that the wage semi-elasticity of participation is roughly
0.43, which combined with the participation rate of 57.5 percent implies the elasticity of
0:75 = 0:43=0:575.
13The estimated value (which is actually negative,  0:13) is insignicant at the 10
percent level. Similar to Saget (1999), however, standard errors do not seem to be corrected
for the presence of predicted variables in the second-stage probit estimation.
14The only exception to the wage inelastic labor supply behavior of Czech married
women in 1993 that Chase nds when he repeats his estimation for samples stratied by
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rate was only 4.3 percent in 1993). Compared to other transition economies,
the Czech Republic had one of the lowest unemployment rates during the
rst phase of its transition. However, in the second half of the 1990s, when
the country entered its rst recession, which induced further restructuraliza-
tion, unemployment rose from 4 percent in 1996 to almost 9 percent in 2000,
as illustrated in Figure 1.15 We therefore expect the labor supply behavior
and the values of wage elasticity of labor force participation in the Czech
Republic in the new steady-state path of the post-transition period to dier
substantially from the one during the turbulent years of the early phases of
transition, as documented in Chase (1995).
3 Model of Labor Supply Decision
The theoretical framework of our analysis is the standard static model of





c = wh + T(wh;y;X) + y; 0  h  H;
where u is a utility function which depends positively on consumption c and
negatively on the number of hours h of work.
The individual consumes the sum of her total earnings w  h, her non-
labor income and other household income y (pre-tax and without social
transfers), and the transfers she gets minus the taxes she pays, as deter-
mined by function T(). The parametrization of T is given by the tax and
benet system, where the amount of taxes and transfers depends on the
level of various types of individual and household income, as well as on the
demographic characteristics (X) of the household. Working hours are re-
stricted to range from zero to the maximum amount H, so that H  h is the
number of hours of leisure.
The maximization problem can be solved in two stages: First is the
choice of the optimal number of hours conditional on working, and second ,
for the optimal decision whether to work. The solution to the rst stage is
given by the rst order condition in which the optimal number of hours of
work h (subject to 0 < h  H) solves the equation






15See for example Svejnar (2002) for development of the Czech labor market in the
context of other transition countries.
16The notation is based on a modied version of the model in Eissa, Kleven, and Kreiner
(2004), extended to capture the household structure and to include the individual's non-
labor and other household income. Fixed costs of working are omitted as they are not
fundamental to the basic idea of the model. The exible form of our econometric model,
however, allows for the presence of the xed costs of working.
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@ w h is the eective marginal tax rate of working an ad-
ditional hour, which includes both the direct marginal tax rate and the
reduction in benets due to the increased earnings. The solution to the
second stage is determined by comparing the utility of working and that of
not working. An individual will work if the former exceeds the latter:
u(h;c)  u(0;c0):
Optimal consumption if the individual does not work (c0), equals the benets
she receives if not working plus her non-labor and other household income,
c0 = T(0;y;X) + y:
Optimal consumption if working is the total individual's labor, non-labor,
and other household income plus net transfers (benets received minus taxes
paid). It may be expressed as





is the eective marginal tax rate of transition from not working to working.
The optimal number of hours of work h is therefore given by
h = h if u(h;c)  u(0;c0);
h = 0 otherwise.
h, which is a function of all the parameters of the model, fully describes
the individual's labor supply.
As described above, the labor supply decision consists of two parts. The
rst is the labor force participation decision or the decision at the extensive
margin, which is the decision to supply labor at all. The second is the choice
of the number of hours of work (conditional on the decision to work), also
referred to as the decision at the intensive margin. A change in the parame-
ters may induce individuals to move along the intensive margin (adjust the
number of hours of work supplied) or to cross the extensive margin (stop or
start working).
As we estimate a model of labor force participation decision, we limit
our focus to the extensive margin only. We do so for the following reasons:
First, in most occupations, people cannot choose the number of hours of work
freely, but rather have them specied as part of their contract. People have
therefore mostly control over the supplied hours of work only in the long run,
when they choose the type of job. Second, dierent occupations are often
characterized by dierent hours and wage combinations.17 If individuals
choose their hours of work and their pay jointly, when choosing their jobs,
17For example, consulting jobs typically pay a high per hour wage but require long
working hours while the opposite is true of some jobs in the public sector.
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separate equations for hours and wage are estimated simultaneously (such
as in Mott, 1984). Third, previous research suggests that hours of work
are typically over-reported and suer from substantial measurement error.18
Fourth, wage elasticity of labor supply seems to be much higher at the
extensive rather than at the intensive margin (see Heckman, 1993), so that
the largest impact of any changes in wages are expected to be on the entry to
or exit from the labor market. We therefore choose labor force participation
decision as our specication of labor supply, as the one that is less aected
by the listed estimation problems and also the one that is more relevant
from a policy perspective.
4 Econometric Model
4.1 Labor Force Participation Decision
Denote LFPi as the indicator that equals one if individual i decides to sup-
ply her labor on the market and zero otherwise. The theory suggests that
LFPi depends on the eective net wage (gross wage net of the explicit and
implicit taxes implied by the eective marginal tax rate of transition from
not working to working); individual's non-labor income and other house-
hold income;19 household characteristics (Xi) and other factors that reect






In order to estimate the eect of wage on labor force participation de-
cision, we approximate the optimal number of hours of work h









where (1 i)wi is the eective net wage, Xi is a vector of all other variables
that aect her decision to work, and "i is an error term assumed to be
independent and normally distributed across individuals, "i  N(0;2
").
The probability that individual i supplies her labor is given by
Pr(LFPi = 1) = Pr(h







i + "i > 0

:
Given our assumptions about the error term "i, the labor force participa-

















18See Bound, Brown, Duncan, and Rodgers (1989) and Juster and Staord (1991) for
the evidence on misreporting.
19If utility is linear in c, the individual's non-labor and other household income (y),
which does not depend on working, cancels out.
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model is non-linear, the impact of the right-hand side variables has to be
expressed in terms of the marginal eects evaluated at dierent values of
the independent variables.20
We follow the standard approach in the literature and dene LFP = 1
for individuals who are working, and for those who do not have a job but
seek employment, and LFP = 0 for those who neither work, nor wish to
work, the so-called inactive. This corresponds to the standard denition of
labor force as the sum of employed and unemployed.21 The assumption is,
in contrast with the inactive, the unemployed do not work only due to the
demand constraints, as no jobs are available.22
Although standard, this assumption somewhat limits the relevance of
our ndings for policy: It is both the supply and demand side of the labor
market that need to be in focus for employment enhancing policies. There
is no guarantee that any policy-induced increase in labor supply will be met
by a corresponding increase in labor demand (that additional individuals
interested in working will nd a job).23
Even if we limit our focus to labor supply dened as desired employment,
we have to bare in mind that labor force participation may be aected by the
demand side conditions not only through the market wage but also through
the shortage of jobs. The discouraged workers desire to work but (because
of an unsuccessful job search) stopped seeking employment, and therefore
are not classied as supplying their work. In our estimation, we proxy the
dierences between the constraints on the demand side by regional indicators
and local unemployment.
The key variable in the model is the individual's wage; the main param-
eter of interest is . As wage enters the equation in logarithm, the marginal
eect corresponding to the coecient , of wage on the probability of sup-
plying labor is the wage semi-elasticity of labor force participation. The wage
elasticity can be calculated by dividing the semi-elasticity by the probability
of labor force participation or by the labor force participation rate.
We estimate two specications of this model: In the rst, we use the gross
20See for example Baltagi (2002), p. 339.
21The standard ILO denition of unemployment requires two other conditions to be met
besides the expressed desire to work: availability to start working and active job search.
22The labor supply decision of the unemployed is not straightforward. The job search
literature tends to regard the unemployed and the inactive as one group of non-employed,
with the inactive characterized by a very high reservation wage. Moreover, in particular
in most of Europe, where unemployment benets and their duration are high and the
eligibility criteria for receiving them are not as strict, it is often believed that many (in
particular the long-term) the unemployed do not in eect supply their work but instead
only rely on government support.
23In a related paper (Bi c akov a, Sla c alek, and Slav k, 2006) which evaluates the scal
eects of personal income tax reforms in the Czech Republic in 2006, we estimate the
probability of working, where the employed are contrasted with the non-employed, who
include both the unemployed and the inactive. The reason for this specication there is
we are mostly interested in the probability of employment, i.e., in both the labor supply
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the eective net monthly wage, which takes into account taxes and benets.
We interpret the dierence between the results from the two specications
as an indicator of the welfare system disincentives.
The construction of the wage variable is described in detail in the next
section. Other right-hand side variables include other income, other eco-
nomic activity in the household and binary indicators of marital status,
presence of children of dierent ages, education, and disability.24
Previous ndings suggest that the eects of wage as well as other right-
hand side variables on the decision to work are often very distinct for women
and men.25 Following the literature surveyed above, we estimate the model
separately by gender.
4.2 Prediction of Gross Wages
The econometric specication presented above uses information on wages,
whether actual or potential, for all individuals. However, potential wages
for those who do not work, are not observed. We use the standard Heckman
(1979) model to estimate the wage equation on the sample of workers, taking
into account the selection to employment. We specify a system of wage
and selection equations, allowing for the correlation between the two error
terms. The system is estimated jointly by maximum likelihood as a bivariate
probit model.26 Again, the estimation is done separately by gender. The
bias-corrected estimated wage equation is used to predict the gross hourly
wage for everybody in our sample.
We then transform the predicted gross hourly wage into full-time equiv-
alent gross monthly wages,27 assuming 40 hours of work per week and 4.3
weeks per month.28 In the estimation of the labor force participation model,
we use the two specications mentioned above: the rst with the predicted
full-time equivalent gross monthly wage, and the second with the eective
net wage, which is the predicted full-time equivalent gross monthly wage net
24The denition variables can be found in section A.1 of the Appendix.
25In particular, the presence of children typically has a positive (but often insignicant)
eect on the labor supply of men, while it has a highly signicant and negative eect on
the labor supply of women. See for example Bi c akov a et al. (2006).
26The specication of the two equations of the Heckman model is described in detail in
section A.2.1 of the Appendix.
27The predicted gross monthly earnings that fell below the Czech statutory minimum
wage in 2002 (36 individuals or 0.5 percent of the predicted wages) were set to the level of
the minimum wage of 5;700 CZK. (Using the exchange rate of August 20, 2007: 1 USD =
20.56 CZK, this is about 280 dollars.)
28To construct the net monthly earnings of non-workers, we need to assume how many
hours they would work. We also need this information to be able to determine into which
tax bracket they would fall. Given that the part-time employment opportunities in the
Czech Republic are still rather limited and most of the employed in the sample work full-
time (forty hours per week), we simply assume that should non-workers start working,
they would work full-time. (The share of individuals working part-time, i.e., less than 35
hours a week, among the individuals with valid weekly hours information is 6.72 percent
for women and 1.45 percent for men in our sample.)
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the eective net wages in the next section.
Our econometric model requires at least one exclusion restriction for
identication of the wage equation and one exclusion restriction for the
identication of labor force participation.29 We use standard demographic
characteristics such as marital status, children, household composition, and
other income (excluding social transfers) as the variables aecting the prob-
ability of working but exclude them from the wage equation, as they are un-
likely to have an impact on an individual's current wage. Dummy variables
for regions and the degree of urbanization of the residence30 are assumed to
aect the wage levels but not the probability of supplying labor.31
Finally, the standard errors (of the coecients and of the marginal ef-
fects) from the model of the labor force participation are bootstrapped to
account for the fact that we are using a predicted wage variable in the esti-
mation.
4.3 Construction of Eective Net Wages
The eective net wage is then constructed from the gross wage as
ENWi = (1   i)  GWi;
where GWi denotes the predicted gross monthly wage of the individual i.
i is the individual-specic eective marginal tax rate of the transition from
not-working to working, dened as32
 = 1  
NW + (SBwork   SBnonwork)
GW
;
where NW is the predicted gross monthly wage net of any taxes or social
contributions such as mandatory health and social insurance, SBwork are
social benets if working, and SBnonwork are social benets if not working.
As the social benets often depend on household composition and typically
target entire households rather than individuals, we include the total social
transfers at the household level in SBwork and SBnonwork. The structure of
the benet system implies that an individual's decision to work will aect
the social transfers received by the entire household. The model implies that
this reduction will be one of the factors considered in the individual's labor
supply decision.
29The exclusion restrictions require that at least one right-hand side variable is unique
to each of the two equations, i.e., is present in one equation and not in the other.
30In addition, when we control for the wage in the labor force participation equation,
we nd that age is no longer signicant. We therefore exclude age from the nal model
and use it as an additional exclusion restriction.
31Both sets of exclusion restrictions have been tested by the simple procedure of includ-
ing them one at a time in the equation from which they are excluded and checking their
signicance with t statistics.
32Constructing eective net wage may be problematic in highly de-motivating benet
systems, where the eective marginal tax rate may be greater than one for some indi-
viduals. There are 126 such cases in our sample. We retain them in the estimation but
topcode the value of i for these observations at 0.99.
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This subsection briey describes the Czech system of personal income taxes
and social benets in eect in 2002. The personal tax scheme was stepwise
with four tax brackets. Tax rates for the four subsequent income brackets
were 15%, 20%, 25%, and 32%. The part of income that falls into the
lower bracket(s) was taxed at the corresponding lower tax rate(s); only the
part that exceeds the lower bracket(s) was taxed at the higher tax rate(s).
Tax rates are applied to a tax base, dened as the sum of various income
categories (e.g., wages, rental and entrepreneurial incomes) minus allowances
for non-taxable items and deductibles. The main social benets consisted of
ve components: parental allowance, child benets, housing benets, social
supplements, and social assistance.
The detailed scheme of taxes and social benets, that we use for the
construction of the eective marginal tax rate and eective net wages, is
summarized in Table 1.33
Taxes were computed using the parameters of the tax system displayed
in the top panel of the table. Net labor income was calculated by subtract-
ing taxes and employee contributions to health and social insurance from
gross income. For each individual, we construct two alternative values of
the total household-level social benets conditional on whether she works.
The middle panel shows how the ve components of social benets were cal-
culated depending on the level of net income; the denition of which varies
across the benets, and on the various minimum living standards (which
are dened in the bottom panel and determined by the composition of the
household).
5 Data
The data come from the Czech Household Income Survey (Mikrocensus)
for the year 2002 collected by the Czech Statistical Oce. The survey
was conducted between February 28 and March 25, 2003 and covers 19;003
individuals in 7;973 households. For our estimation, we select only the
individuals who are 25{54 years old. Students, the self-employed, and fully
disabled individuals are excluded. In all these cases, as well as for the very
young and the very old, the labor supply decision is more complex than the
theoretical and econometric models which are used here can capture. Given
these restrictions, the estimation sample consists of 6;767 individuals; 3;094
men; and 3;673 women living in 3;518 households. As the estimation is done
separately for women and men, we split and describe our sample by gender.
Table 2 summarizes the basic characteristics of the most relevant vari-
ables. The denitions of all the variables are presented in section A.1 in the
Appendix. Female and male labor force participation rates in our sample
are 84 and 98 percent, respectively. The proportion of the unemployed is
33Table 1 is adapted from table 1 of Galu s c ak and Pavel (2005). For details of the Czech
tax and benet system, see also Jurajda and Zubrick y (2005).
16
ECB
Working Paper Series No 887
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ts, 2002
Item Amount (%/CZK per Month)
Social Security Contributions %
12:5









27601 and more 32
Parental Allowance
 CZK per Month
Child below 4 Years 1:1MLSi
Child Benets (CZK per Month)
I1 < 1:1  MLStot 0:32MLSch
1:1  MLStot < I1 < 1:8  MLStot 0:28MLSch
1:8  MLStot < I1 < 3  MLStot 0:14MLSch
Housing Benet (CZK per Month)
I2 < MLStot MLShh   MLShh=1:6
MLStot < I2 < 1:6  MLStot MLShh   (MLShh  I2)=(1:6  MLSf)
Social Supplement (CZK per Month)
I2 < MLStot MLSch   MLSch=1:6
MLStot < I2 < 1:6  MLStot MLSch   (MLSch  I2)=(1:6  MLSf)
Social Assistance (CZK per Month)
I3 < MLStot MLStot   I3
Minimum Living Standard (MLS) CZK per Month
Adults (MLSi) 2320
Dependent Children (MLSch)







3 or 4 Members 2880
5 and More Members 3230
Notes: Adapted from table 1 of Galu s c ak and Pavel (2005). The CZK/USD exchange
rate on August 20, 2007: 1 USD = 20.56 CZK. The mean and median gross wage in
our estimation sample are 16001 CZK and 14697 CZK, respectively, for men and 12599
CZK and 11076, respectively, for women. MLStot: total minimum living standard of
the household|the sum of the individual parts of each member (MLSi/MLSch) and the
household part (MLShh).
: spouse is inactive or earning less than the basic tax allowance
per person;
: the allowance is provided if the individual earns less than MLSi. Benets
are not subject to taxes. I1: net earnings of both spouses + unemployment benets +
parental allowance. I2 = I1+child benets. I3 = I2+housing benet+social supplement.
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Men Women
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Labor Force Participation 0.98 0.14 0.84 0.37
Unemployed 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20
Other Income 482 2,784 543 2,267
Age 39.5 8.9 39.3 8.9
Higher Education 0.48 0.50 0.56 0.50
Married 0.66 0.47 0.69 0.46
Children < 2 Years 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31
Children 3{5 Years 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.32
Children 6{9 Years 0.15 0.36 0.17 0.38
Children 10{15 Years 0.25 0.43 0.30 0.46
No. Hh Members 3.11 1.22 3.18 1.13
Other Ec Act in Hh 0.31 0.63 0.40 0.64
Partly Disabled 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15
Sample Size 3,094 3,673
Notes:
: Other income is the sum of the non-labor income of the individual and other
household income (after tax and excluding social benets) in 2002 CZK. Other econom-
ically active members in the household (\Other Ec Act in Hh") are all the household
members (excluding the head and, if present, the spouse) who currently work.
comparable for the two genders: 4.3 percent for women and 4.4 percent for
men.34
Other income, dened as the sum of the non-labor income of the indi-
vidual and other household income (after tax and excluding social benets),
varies substantially and is 543 Czech korunas (CZK) per month for house-
holds in which women live, and 482 CZK for households in which men live,
on average.35
The mean age is slightly less than 40 years for both genders. About
half of the respondents, 56 percent of women and 48 percent of men, have
higher education, dened as having completed secondary education. Almost
70 percent of men and women in our sample are married. The children
variables are binary indicators of the presence of children of a particular age
in the household.36 The distribution of the presence of children of dierent
ages is fairly similar for women and men. A typical household has about
34The aggregate unemployment rate for the whole population older than 25 years was
6.1 percent overall, 9.0 percent for women and 4.7 percent for men in 2002. The rates
for the two genders are much more similar in our sample than usually documented by
aggregate statistics because of the exclusion of the self-employed, who are more likely to
be men, which reduces the measured unemployment rate of men relative to women.
35The distribution of other income is highly skewed: 2038 individuals (30 percent) have
no other income and 75% have less than 135 CZK per month.
36Children can be linked to their parents only for household heads and their spouse. As
we are using all individuals in the household to increase our sample size, we are limited to
the use of the information about the presence of children in the household. This may be
adequate information as child care may be provided by other members of the household
and therefore aects their labor supply as well.
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presence of economically active members other than the analyzed individual
and her spouse.
Women are somewhat more likely to live in households with other eco-
nomically active members (30 percent of households) than men (40 percent
of households). About 2 percent of individuals of both genders are partly
disabled.
6 Results
The results from the rst stage of our estimation, the Heckman model of the
system of wage and selection equations, used for the prediction of the gross
hourly wages, are in line with our prior expectations and with the evidence
from the literature for standard market economies.37 Wages increase with
age and education. The degree of urbanization of the residence also leads
to a higher wage, as does living in Prague (the Czech capital). On the
contrary, disability signicantly reduces the wage level. While the results
for the wage equation are fairly similar by gender, the selection equation
shows more substantial dierences between men and women. In particular,
the eect of the presence of children is negative and large for women, while
it is not signicant for men. The eect of being married is negative for
women but positive for men. Otherwise, the probability of the selection
into employment increases for both genders with age and education, and
decreases with other income, other economic activity in the household, and
for the partly disabled.
The marginal eects from the estimated probit model of the labor force
participation are presented in Tables 3 and 4. Although mean marginal
eects would be preferable, the eects presented in these two tables are
calculated at the means of the variables.38 We use this convention here in
order to simplify the calculation of the bootstrapped standard errors. For
a subset of results, we later show the mean marginal eects, i.e., the means
of the marginal eects evaluated for each individual for comparison. The
results do not seem to dier substantially with the method employed.
The two tables show the results for men and women respectively and
compare the specication with the gross wage and with the eective net
wage. Exploring the t of the model based on two standard measures,
pseudo-R2 and 2 statistics of the Wald test of all coecients (except for
the constant) being equal to zero, suggests that for both the male and female
sample, the specication with an eective net wage performs better than the
one with the gross wage.
The wage semi-elasticity of probability of supplying labor|the key pa-
rameter of interest|is given in the rst rows of the two tables.39
37The full sets of estimates from the Heckman model are available in section A.2.1 of
the Appendix.
38Marginal eects of binary right-hand-side variables are computed as a discrete change
in the predicted probability, induced by the value of the variable changing from 0 to 1.
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March 2008Wage semi-elasticity of labor supply is substantially larger for women
than for men (in both specications). While gross wage has no signicant
eect on male labor force participation decision (even at the 10 percent
level), its eect is highly signicant for women and implies that a one percent
increase in gross monthly wage increases the probability of supplying labor
by 0.16 percentage point for a woman with the average characteristics in
the sample. The corresponding elasticites,40 calculated by dividing these
numbers with the predicted probability of labor force participation at means
of variables, are 0.0221 and 0.1766 for men and women, respectively.41
Focusing on the second specication, the semi-elasticities of labor force
participation to eective net wage are about one-third as large as to gross
wage: A one percent rise in eective net wage increases the probability of
supplying labor by about a 0.06 percentage point for women and by less
than 0.01 percentage point for men, but both eects are signicant at the 1
percent level. The corresponding wage elasticities are 0.0086 and 0.0595 for
men and women, respectively.
We conjecture that the gross wage elasticities are greater than the ef-
fective net wage elasticities mainly because the eective net wage is dis-
tributed among individuals more unevenly.42 This result follows because
the marginal eective tax rate that we use to construct the eective net
wage, takes into account both the actual income taxes and social contribu-
tion and the implicit taxation (reduction in social transfers associated with
wage increases).43
As we have so far evaluated the marginal eects at the means of the
variables, they only represent the response of an individual with average
characteristics. We next explore in Tables 5 and 6 how the estimated wage
semi-elasticities vary across the dierent wage levels. The marginal eects
in these two tables are computed as within-quintile and overall averages of
the marginal eects evaluated for each individual. Comparing the overall
and is therefore equal to the marginal eect of wage on the probability of supplying labor,
i.e., MFX =
@ Pr(LFP=1)
@ ln(W) =   (ln(W) + X), where () is the standard normal
probability density function. The estimated eect can be interpreted as follows: A one
percent rise in wage increases the probability of supplying labor by 0:01  MFX (or the
labor force participation rate from LFP % to [LFP + MFX]%).




Pr(LFP=1) and can be therefore calculated
as  =

Pr(LFP=1), using the estimated value of  and the predicted value of Pr(LFP = 1)
evaluated at the means of variables.
41These elasticities are close to wage semi-elasticities reported in Tables 3 and 4 because
the predicted participation rates are close to 1 (99.1 and 91.5 percent for men and women,
respectively).
42Intuitively, the estimated elasticities are proportional to the covariance of employment
with wage and are inversely related to variance of wage (think a linear version of our
probability model). While the rst term happens to be similar for both specications, the
higher variance of the eective net wage leads to a lower value of the estimated elasticity
than in the model with gross wage.
43The variance of the eective net wage ENW = NW + SBwork   SBnonwork is
higher than that of gross wage primarily due to the social benets SBwork and especially
SBnonwork, which vary substantially across people. The distribution of simple after-tax
wages, however, is (as in most countries) naturally more compressed than that of gross
wages, due to the redistributive character of the Czech tax system.
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Gross Wage Eective Net Wage
Variable Marg E (Std Error) Marg E (Std Error)
Log Wage 0:0219 (0:0207) 0:0085 (0:0018)
Other Income  0:0088 (0:0039)  0:0076 (0:0032)
Marriedd 0:0064 (0:0042) 0:0019 (0:0032)
Higher Educationd 0:0042 (0:0079) 0:0028 (0:0028)
Other Ec Act in Hh  0:0040 (0:0018)  0:0061 (0:0017)
Children <2 Yearsd 0:0036 (0:0039) 0:0063 (0:0024)
Children 3{5 Yearsd  0:0083 (0:0072)  0:0036 (0:0059)
Children 6{9 Yearsd  0:0019 (0:0047) 0:0007 (0:0035)
Children 10{15 Yearsd 0:0019 (0:0038) 0:0039 (0:0030)





Notes: Marginal eects evaluated at the means of variables.
d: A discrete change of the
dummy variable from 0 to 1. f
y;
;
g = Statistical signicance at f10;5;1g percent.
Bootstrapped standard errors, 500 replications.
Table 4: Marginal Eects|Women
Gross Wage Eective Net Wage
Variable Marg E (Std Error) Marg E (Std Error)
Log Wage 0:1616 (0:0539) 0:0550 (0:0063)
Other Income  0:0608 (0:0234)  0:0418y (0:0216)
Marriedd  0:0284 (0:0111)  0:0419 (0:0100)
Higher Educationd  0:0256 (0:0225)  0:0150 (0:0109)
Other Ec Act in Hh  0:0930 (0:0074)  0:1020 (0:0077)
Children <2 Yearsd  0:5848 (0:0300)  0:5461 (0:0322)
Children 3{5 Yearsd  0:3672 (0:0274)  0:3538 (0:0285)
Children 6{9 Yearsd  0:0564 (0:0165)  0:0418 (0:0146)
Children 10{15 Yearsd  0:0274 (0:0128)  0:0139 (0:0120)





Notes: Marginal eects evaluated at the means of variables.
d: A discrete change of the
dummy variable from 0 to 1. f
y;
;
g = Statistical signicance at f10;5;1g percent.
Bootstrapped standard errors, 500 replications.
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ects by Wage and Gender { Gross Wages
Wage Men Women
Quintile Wage (CZK) MFX Wage (CZK) MFX
Q1 Below 12,430 0:0787 Below 8,949 0:1891
Q2 Below 13,204 0:0328 Below 9,732 0:1406
Q3 Below 15,772 0:0289 Below 12,531 0:1553
Q4 Below 17,142 0:0141 Below 13,534 0:1428
Q5 Above 17,142 0:0118 Above 13,534 0:1011
All 0:0313 0:1431




g = Statistical signicance at f10;5;1g percent.
Table 6: Marginal Eects by Wage and Gender { Eective Net Wage
Wage Men Women
Quintile Wage (CZK) MFX Wage (CZK) MFX
Q1 Below 12,430 0:0338 Below 8,949 0:0638
Q2 Below 13,204 0:0137 Below 9,732 0:0468
Q3 Below 15,772 0:0128 Below 12,531 0:0539
Q4 Below 17,142 0:0062y Below 13,534 0:0500
Q5 Above 17,142 0:0057y Above 13,534 0:0375
All 0:0136 0:0497




g = Statistical signicance at f10;5;1g percent.
marginal eects in the bottom lines of these two tables with the marginal
eects in Tables 3 and 4 suggests that our main results are reasonably invari-
ant to whether the eects are evaluated at means or whether mean marginal
eects are computed.44
In agreement with previous literature, the results show that wage semi-
elasticity decreases with wage level. This is true for both specications and
both genders, with the only exception of women in the second quintile that
tend to be somewhat less responsive to the wage than those in the third
and fourth quintile. The values are, however, very close, and the dierences
across these quintiles are insignicant.
The cross-quintile dierences are substantially more pronounced for men
than for women. The semi-elasticity of labor force participation of men with
respect to the eective net wage is signicant at 1 percent in the rst quintile
and is almost six times greater than the wage semi-elasticity in the fth
quintile, which is moreover only weakly signicant. A one percent increase
44The earlier, however, allow us to obtain the correct standard errors through simple
bootstrapping methods, which is why we choose to present these in the rst two tables.
The signicance in the other two tables is only approximate.
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quintile by 3.38 percentage points, almost three times more than what is the
overall average marginal eect. The eect of gross wage on the probability
of supplying labor is insignicant for each quintile. The wage-elasticity of
women is distributed more equally across the quintiles, with the size in the
rst quintile being less than twice the size in the fth quintile. While the
gross wage semi-elasticity ranges from 0.19 in the rst quintile to 0.10 in the
fth, the range for the eective net wage elasticity is between 0.06 and 0.04.
We interpret the dierence between the two estimated elasticities as an
indicator of the welfare system disincentives. This behavior-based measure
suggests that in the presence of taxes and benets, more substantial changes
in the gross wage are required to induce the same increase in labor force
participation compared to the case with no welfare system.
Measured as the dierence between the marginal eects for the gross
and the eective net wage specications, the welfare system disincentives
are greater for women than for men and vary only little with wages. The
marginal eect of the eective net wage on labor force participation is lower
than the eect of the gross wage by 65 and 57 percent for women and men,
respectively. The disincentives vary between 52 and 57 percent for men and
between 63 and 67 percent for women across the ve wage quintiles and tend
to be a bit lower for the rich.
Based on the comparison of the results from the two specications, we
conclude that the Czech welfare system in 2002 reduces the labor supply re-
sponse of men and women to the market wage by 39 percent and 34 percent,
respectively.
The estimated eects of other determinants of labor force participation
are also in line with the results documented in the standard literature, which
suggests that labor supply behavior in the post-transition Czech Republic
is comparable to the one in mature market economies.
Both other income and other economic activity in the household capture
other sources of non-social income, alternative to the income from the indi-
vidual's labor supply. Their coecients therefore measure the income eect
on labor supply and are, in line with economic theory, both negative and
signicant.
Once we control for the wage levels, education has no eect on labor
force participation for both specications and for both genders. This result
is not surprising as wages are highly correlated with education.45 Partial
disability substantially decreases the probability of supplying labor, with the
size of the eect for women (decreasing participation probability by almost
0.5) being more than twice that for men.
Children have no eect on whether men supply labor, but they substan-
tially reduce the labor force participation probability of women. The size of
the eect sharply declines with children's age.46 Similar to the eect of the
45The same holds for age and age squared that we decided to leave out of the nal
model of labor force participation as an additional exclusion restriction.
46The fact that the presence of children below 2 years of age increases male labor force
participation for the eective net wage specication most likely captures the need for other
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force participation of women.
The sign and signicance of the marginal eects of the variables other
than wage seem to be fairly similar across the two specications for both
women and men.
Finally, in order to make our estimates directly comparable to the values
estimated in the two previous studies of labor force participation of married
women in Hungary and in the Czech and Slovak Republics (Saget, 1999
and Chase, 1995, respectively), we restrict our sample to married women
and repeat our analysis. Although the estimated wage elasticity slightly
increases, in line with the documented evidence that the labor supply of
married women is typically more wage sensitive than that of single women,
the results do not substantially change. While gross wage semi-elasticity
increases from 0.1616 to 0.1758, the eective net wage semi-elasticity changes
from 0.0550 to 0.0566.47
7 International Context and Policy Implications
In many Communist countries|including Czechoslovakia, East Germany,
and the Soviet Union|labor force participation was obligatory.48 Although
a gradual withdrawal from the labor market occurred during the transition
from planned to market economies,49 the labor force participation rates in
many European post-Communist countries, in particular among women, re-
main still high, when compared to mature market economies such as France,
Germany and the US (see Table 7).50
The low estimates of wage elasticity of the labor supply in the Czech
Republic are consistent with the evidence documented for mature market
economies that labor force participation and wage sensitivity of labor supply
are inversely related (see Blau and Kahn, 2007 and Alesina and Ichino, 2007).
We therefore expect a weak response of labor supply to wages also in other
post-transition countries which have retained high labor force participation
rates since the Communist period.
Our ndings suggest that changes in taxes or benets resulting in changes
of the eective net wage will have the greatest impact on individuals at the
bottom of the wage distribution and also on women (rather than on men).51
sources of income when women stay at home with their very young children.
47The full estimation results for the subsample of married women are available from the
authors upon request.
48Interestingly, this was not the case in other Communist countries, such as Poland
or Hungary. However, female labor force participation rate in these countries was still
fairly high according to the ILO statistics (around 80 percent), compared to the Western
Europe.
49There are a few studies, such as Bonin and Euwals (2005), that try to disentangle
whether this was due to the change in the supply (some people stopped working once
the choice became available) or demand (obsolete human capital left many people jobless,
some of whom left the labor force).
50Bonin and Euwals (2005) reports that the female participation rates in East Germany
were over 80 percent before the change of the regime in 1989.
51For example Alesina and Ichino (2007) argue for gender-specic taxation: Because the
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Men Women
Country 1988 2005 1988 2005
Czech Republic 97:0 94:8 93:1 81:6
Slovakia 96:9 93:2 88:8 82:5
Russia 96:2 92:5 91:7 86:3
Germanyy 90:6 93:3 60:8 80:0
France 95:6 93:6 71:2 80:3
United States 93:6 90:7 72:7 76:7
Notes: Participation rates (ratios of economically active to total population) for individ-
uals between 25 and 54 years of age.
y: The Federal Republic of Germany (1988 gures
exclude the German Democratic Republic). Source: Economically Active Population Esti-
mates and Projections, International Labour Organization, http://laborsta.ilo.org/.
Policy measures aimed at enhancing labor supply should therefore pri-
marily target these groups and focus on income taxes at the lowest tax
brackets and on the potential disincentives of the out-of-work benets and
benets to low income families. Under the current benet scheme, major
changes in labor force participation should not be expected in response to
changes in tax levels because the estimated eects are fairly small even for
the most wage-elastic individuals.
As part of the changes in the Czech welfare system, tax reform imple-
mented in January 2006 extended the range of the lowest tax bracket and
decreased the tax rate in the lowest two brackets from 15 to 12 percent
and from 20 to 19 percent, respectively. Its focus on the reduction of disin-
centives due to the tax burden of the individuals with wages in the lowest
quintile of the wage distribution is in line with our nding that it is low
wage individuals who are likely to respond to the changes in the eective
net wage most.52
8 Conclusion
We provide one of the rst estimates of labor supply using Czech data. We
construct a measure of the eective net wage, which takes into account the
tax and benet system, and estimate wage elasticity of labor force partici-
labor supply of women is more responsive to wages, the optimal income tax rates (other
things being equal), which minimize the dead-weight loss, are lower for women than for
men.
52New tax reform, eective since January 2008, introduced a at tax rate of 15 percent.
Because the income tax is newly levied on the total labor cost (gross earnings plus em-
ployer's social security contributions) the tax rate eectively amounts to 23 percent. The
overall eect of this new reform on the taxation of the poor is yet to be seen because the
denitions of taxable income and non-taxable items have changed.
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wage respectively.
While our analysis is subject to many limitations, a number of conclu-
sions emerge clearly and robustly. We nd that a one percent rise in the
eective net wage increases the male labor force participation rate by a 0.01
percentage point and female labor force participation rate by a 0.06 per-
centage point.53 The eective net wage semi-elasticity of the probability of
labor supply decreases with wage, in particular for men. Wage elasticities
of labor force participation of men and women in the bottom 20 percent of
the wage distribution are 0.034 and 0.064 percentage points, respectively.
Tax and benet policies with the aim of enhancing labor force participation
should thus primarily target low wage individuals and also women rather
than men.
When we replace the eective net wage with the gross wage, the corre-
sponding semi-elasticities are 0.16 for women and 0.02 (but insignicant) for
men. We interpret the dierence between the two estimated elasticities as a
behavior-based measure as an indicator of the welfare system disincentives
and conclude that the Czech tax and benet system in 2002 reduces the
labor supply response of women to the market wage by 65 percent and that
of men by 57 percent.
While our qualitative results are in line with previous research, sug-
gesting that labor supply behavior in the post-transition Czech Republic is
comparable to the one in mature market economies, the estimated eects
are relatively small. This result is consistent with the recent empirical evi-
dence that the labor supply in countries with high labor force participation
rates, such as in the Czech Republic, tends to be less sensitive to wages. We
therefore expect a limited response of labor supply to wages also in other
post-transition countries, which have retained high labor force participation
rates since the Communist period.
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A.1 Denitions of Key Variables
Labor force participation: A binary indicator that equals one if an indi-
vidual is working (employed) or looking for a job (unemployed), refers
to the dominant economic activity during the past year54
Log Wage: Logarithm of either a gross monthly wage or the eective net
monthly wage (predicted by the Heckman model and calculated by the
authors)
Other Income: The sum of non-labor income of the individual and other
household income (after tax and excluding social benets)55
Married: A binary variable indicating whether the individual is married
Higher Education: An indicator of having completed high-school educa-
tion or higher
Other Ec Act in Hh: The number of household members (excluding the
head and, if present, the spouse), who currently work
Children <2 Years: A binary variable indicating whether any children
younger than 2 years of age are present in the household
Children 3{5 Years: A binary variable indicating whether any children
between 3 and 5 years of age are present in the household
Children 6{9 Years: A binary variable indicating whether any children
between 6 and 9 years of age are present in the household
Children 10{15 Years: A binary variable indicating whether any children
between 10 and 15 years of age are present in the household
Partly Disabled: A binary variable indicating whether the individual has
partial disability (fully disabled individuals are excluded from the sam-
ple)
Age: Age of the individual
Age2: The second power of the age of the individual
54Ideally, this indicator should reect the current labor force status of the individual, but
this information is not present in our data. This is may lead to an under-representation of
short-run non-workers and an over-representation of long-term non-workers. Fortunately,
for most people in the dataset (82 percent), the prevailing economic activity stays the
same during the whole year.
55It has been constructed as the net monetary household income minus social income
minus the net working income of the individual. As only gross labor income is reported
for individuals, net working income is in turn computed as 0.875total gross income from
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March 2008Region 2 to Region 14: A binary indicators of the level 2 NUTS region
of residence of the household (Region 1 denotes the capital, Prague,
and is the base category)
Size of Town: Categorical variable denoting the degree of urbanization of
the place of household's residence
Local Unemployment: The unemployment rate in the district (level 2
NUTS region) of the residence of the household
A.2 Other Estimation Results
A.2.1 Constructing Wages|The Heckman Model
When workers systematically dier in their unobserved characteristics from
non-workers and when the unobservable component of the decision to work
is related to the unobservable component of the wage level,56 a simple wage
equation is aected by sample selection and the standard OLS estimates are
biased. We follow Heckman (1979) and estimate a wage equation controlling
for the selection into employment.






GHWi is observed only if EMPi = 1;
where GHWi is the gross hourly wage, EMPi is an indicator whether an
individual i works, and GHWi is observed only if EMPi = 1. Zi and Xi are
vectors of variables that determine the individual's i's wage and employment
respectively. Error terms ui and ei are assumed to be independent across
individuals and jointly normally distributed with zero means, variances 2
u
and 2
e and correlation ue. The two equations are estimated jointly by
maximum likelihood.
Gross hourly wage is calculated by dividing the annual wage with hours
worked per year.57 We exclude outliers (i.e., the top and bottom 1 percent of
the sample), by replacing the top and bottom percentiles, 147 observations
in total, with missing values before running the Heckman regression.
Tables 8 and 9 report the estimates of the wage and the selection-to-
employment equations, as well as the correlation of the error terms from the
Heckman model.
We use the estimated system to predict gross hourly wages for everybody
in the sample. We next convert the gross hourly wage to full-time equiv-
alent gross monthly wage by multiplying the predicted gross hourly wage
56For example, individuals who are more likely to work may have on average higher
wages.
57The annual hours worked equal the weekly hours times months worked (both given in
the dataset) times 4.33 (the assumed number of weeks per month).
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statutory minimum wage in 2002 (36 individuals or 0.5 percent of the pre-
dicted wages) were set to the level of the minimum wage of 5;700 CZK (277
USD).
Table 8: Heckman Estimation Results|Men
Variable Coecient (Std. Err.)








NUTS Region CZ02 -0.032 (0.031)
NUTS Region CZ03 -0.134
 (0.035)
NUTS Region CZ04 -0.134
 (0.035)
NUTS Region CZ05 -0.102
 (0.041)
NUTS Region CZ06 -0.157
 (0.053)
NUTS Region CZ07 -0.139
 (0.043)
NUTS Region CZ08 -0.119
 (0.040)
NUTS Region CZ09 -0.164
 (0.039)
NUTS Region CZ10 -0.132
 (0.036)
NUTS Region CZ11 -0.136
 (0.037)
NUTS Region CZ12 -0.193
 (0.043)
NUTS Region CZ13 -0.114
 (0.039)
NUTS Region CZ14 -0.135
 (0.047)
Size of Town 0.014
 (0.004)















Other Ec Act in Hh -0.182
y (0.095)
Kids < 2 Years -0.032 (0.274)
Kids 3-5 Years -0.492
 (0.232)
Children 6{9 Years -0.236 (0.219)
Children 10{15 Years -0.044 (0.191)
Partly Disabled -1.936
 (0.187)
NUTS Region CZ02 0.126 (0.322)
NUTS Region CZ03 0.060 (0.396)
NUTS Region CZ04 -0.302 (0.321)
NUTS Region CZ05 1.041 (0.750)
NUTS Region CZ06 -0.182 (0.281)
NUTS Region CZ07 0.430 (0.633)
NUTS Region CZ08 -0.525 (0.327)
NUTS Region CZ10 -0.345 (0.309)
NUTS Region CZ11 0.423 (0.366)
NUTS Region CZ12 -0.527
y (0.278)
NUTS Region CZ13 -0.482
y (0.293)
NUTS Region CZ14 -0.259 (0.245)
Size of Town 0.018 (0.035)
Intercept 1.724 (1.687)
Continued on next page...
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Variable Coecient (Std. Err.)
Equation 3 : athrho
Intercept -0.328 (0.243)








Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%;
\NUTS Region CZ...": dummy variables indicating
the region (denoted with its 2 level NUTS number).
Table 9: Heckman Estimation Results|Women
Variable Coecient (Std. Err.)






NUTS Region CZ02 -0.047 (0.030)
NUTS Region CZ03 -0.126
 (0.033)
NUTS Region CZ04 -0.167
 (0.033)
NUTS Region CZ05 -0.090
 (0.039)
NUTS Region CZ06 -0.136
 (0.052)
NUTS Region CZ07 -0.163
 (0.040)
NUTS Region CZ08 -0.108
 (0.038)
NUTS Region CZ09 -0.136
 (0.038)
NUTS Region CZ10 -0.210
 (0.035)
NUTS Region CZ11 -0.109
 (0.036)
NUTS Region CZ12 -0.139
 (0.041)
NUTS Region CZ13 -0.184
 (0.037)
NUTS Region CZ14 -0.148
 (0.045)
Size of Town 0.022
 (0.004)

















Other Ec Act in Hh -0.581
 (0.048)
Children < 2 Years -2.164
 (0.103)
Children 3-5 Years -1.472
 (0.096)
Children 6{9 Years -0.385
 (0.089)




NUTS Region CZ02 0.109 (0.150)
NUTS Region CZ03 0.013 (0.171)
NUTS Region CZ04 -0.002 (0.170)
Continued on next page...
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Variable Coecient (Std. Err.)
NUTS Region CZ05 0.039 (0.190)
NUTS Region CZ06 -0.179 (0.142)
NUTS Region CZ07 -0.160 (0.189)
NUTS Region CZ08 0.248 (0.228)
NUTS Region CZ10 -0.088 (0.166)
NUTS Region CZ11 -0.042 (0.146)
NUTS Region CZ12 0.128 (0.162)
NUTS Region CZ13 -0.102 (0.164)
NUTS Region CZ14 -0.474
 (0.122)
Size of Town 0.031
y (0.018)
Intercept -0.175 (0.868)
Equation 3 : athrho
Intercept -0.140
y (0.080)








Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%;
\NUTS Region CZ...": dummy variables indicating
the region (denoted with its 2 level NUTS number).
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Variable Coecient (Std Error)
Log Wage 0:867 (1:107)
Other Income  0:347 (0:157)
Married 0:229 (0:151)
Higher Education 0:167 (0:365)
Other Ec Act in Hh  0:159 (0:076)
Kids <2 Years 0:163 (0:285)
Kids 3{5 Years  0:257 (0:216)
Kids 6{9 Years  0:070 (0:199)
Kids 10{15 Years 0:077 (0:219)






Notes: Predicted gross monthly wage, other income is all non-labor income and other




g = Statistical signicance at f10;5;1g percent.
Table 11: Probit Estimation Results|Gross Wages, Women
Variable Coecient (Std Error)
Log Wage 1:039 (0:351)
Other Income  0:391 (0:151)
Married  0:192 (0:079)
Higher Education  0:167 (0:149)
Other Ec Act in Hh  0:598 (0:050)
Kids <2 Years  1:944 (0:092)
Kids 3{5 Years  1:352 (0:084)
Kids 6{9 Years  0:315 (0:079)
Kids 10{15 Years  0:168 (0:078)






Notes: Predicted gross monthly wage, other income is all non-labor income and other




g = Statistical signicance at f10;5;1g percent.
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Variable Coecient (Std Error)
Log Wage 0:412 (0:074)
Other Income  0:368 (0:183)
Married 0:089 (0:170)
Higher Education 0:137 (0:154)
Other Ec Act in Hh  0:294 (0:073)
Kids <2 Years 0:460 (0:322)
Kids 3{5 Years  0:151 (0:236)
Kids 6{9 Years 0:036 (0:204)
Kids 10{15 Years 0:211 (0:224)






Notes: Predicted gross monthly wage, other income is all non-labor income and other




g = Statistical signicance at f10;5;1g percent.
Table 13: Probit Estimation Results|Net Wages, Women
Variable Coecient (Std Error)
Log Wage 0:386 (0:037)
Other Income  0:294y (0:150)
Married  0:320 (0:082)
Higher Education  0:106 (0:076)
Other Ec Act in Hh  0:716 (0:050)
Kids <2 Years  1:882 (0:084)
Kids 3{5 Years  1:362 (0:082)
Kids 6{9 Years  0:260 (0:082)
Kids 10{15 Years  0:095 (0:081)






Notes: Predicted gross monthly wage, other income is all non-labor income and other




g = Statistical signicance at f10;5;1g percent.
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